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Introduction 
As a self-confessed integrative criminologist (Barak, 2003a; 1998a) and as an 
author of two textbooks on criminology (Barak, 2009; 1998b) and one on violence 
and nonviolence (Barak, 2003b), which have all made reference to evolution and 
evolutionary theory, evolutionary ecological theory, and evolutionary psychology, I 
am generally in agreement with Durrant and Ward’s argument that “the application 
of evolutionary theory to human behaviour provides a valuable opportunity for 
criminologists to broaden their theoretical horizons and more fully consider how 
evolutionary approaches may contribute to their discipline.” I also concur with their 
reasons as to why criminology should incorporate evolutionary explanations into the 
discipline as I have specifically done in area discussions on aggression, violence, and 
antisocial behavior. Similarly, like Durrant and Ward, I too have adopted over the 
years a pluralistic approach to integration in general, which would include applying 
evolutionary theory in particular. Hence, in the case of this “critic,” we have Durrant 
and Ward preaching to a member of the same choir.  
  For me and I do not know about Durrant and Ward, I was not too surprised to 
discover that among the 13 chapters devoted to “new approaches” in McLaughlin and 
Newburn (2010) that there were none dealing with either evolutionary theory or 
evolutionary psychology. However, I was more surprised to learn that there were no 
applications or indexed references to these topics, especially as I was the author for 
that volume on the chapter addressing integrated criminology. In fact, I double-Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
Special Edition 2012, Vol. 4)1): 54-61    Barak 
 
39 
 
checked my own contribution. To my chagrin, while I had included several areas or 
examples of integrated approaches to criminological theory and knowledge, I was 
indeed guilty of omitting any reference to evolutionary theories or evolutionary 
psychology on this occasion. I think, in part, this reflects upon and reinforces Durrant 
and Ward’s argument about the material absence or substantive dearth of 
criminological explanations with any kind of evolutionary lens or perspective.   
I also think that this reflects, in part, the parochial focuses of the discipline 
over the past century. That is to say, despite the field’s alleged interdisciplinary 
pedigree, the legacy or nature of modern criminology, at its best, has never been 
more than a multidisciplinary endeavor. I would further argue that the omissions 
from evolution theory or evolutionary psychology are symptomatic of the sociological 
and positivistic biases of criminological theory building. Accordingly, when doing 
integrated criminology I consciously try to avoid (mostly, but not always) these 
biases because I believe that each inhibits what I regard as some of the “best” kinds 
of integrated models (see Chapter 11 in Barak, 2009). For a couple of integrated 
models that implicitly, if not, explicitly incorporate “evolutionary perspectives,” I 
would refer readers to “White Supremacist Behavior: Toward an integrated Social 
Psychological Model” by Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo (2000) and to a more 
contentious integration by Shlomo Shoham (2005) on mythogenes and myths.  
In the latter model, as a means of explaining or theorizing about the micro-
worlds of interpersonal violence and individual delinquency or the macro-worlds of 
collective violence and state genocide, Shoham integrates the projected myths of 
groups and the projected mythogenes of individuals. His model is steeped in a 
diversity of criminological strands that incorporate theories from the areas of 
cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis, labeling and stigma, bonding and 
identification, and conflict and culture. Specifically, in both the events of delinquency 
and genocide Shoham captures the common linkages between theories of differential Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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association, identification, and opportunity structures and the processes of social 
stigma involved in individual/group delinquency and gang behavior up through the 
ultimate crime of annihilation of one tribe, society, or nation by another.  
 
Evolutionary Behavioural Science 
  In their succinct breakdown and overview of evolutionary behavioural science, 
again, I find myself in agreement with Durrant and Ward. I also think that the three 
main assumptions underscored by Durrant and Ward is defensible and I appreciate 
the connections drawn between these, the Neo-Darwinian synthesis, and the 
expanding theoretical developments in the scope of evolutionary processes. Finally, I 
could not agree more with their argument that it is not about whether evolutionary 
theory is relevant to understanding human behavior, but rather, it is about 
developing an understanding of the place or role (or application) of this theory within 
the social and behavioral sciences.  
In short, the omission of evolutionary theory and its role in human behavior is 
not unlike the omission of biology and its role in sexual, social, and criminal 
behavior. In other words, these kinds of interactive denials of behavioral realities or 
misunderstandings of the relevance of evolutionary psychology, for example, in 
criminological as well as non-criminological explanations of behavior make no sense 
in general and even less sense from anthropological perspectives in particular. 
Perhaps my strongest concurrence with Durrant and Ward emanates from their 
conclusion that a “laundry list of standard criticisms” on the scientific value of 
applying evolutionary explanations of human behavior to crime or antisocial behavior 
generates “more light than heat.”  
 
 
 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
Special Edition 2012, Vol. 4)1): 54-61    Barak 
 
41 
 
Evolutionary Behavioral Science and Criminological Theory 
  Here again, I like Durrant and Ward’s application and modification of 
Tinbergen’s typology of biological accounting for specific characteristics of organisms, 
with their emphasis on the greater importance of social and cultural processes in 
explaining human behavior. As for the multitude of diverse ways of doing integration, 
I too have been an advocate of vertical integration as an especially useful means 
because of its non-generalizing and complementary nature. As Durrant and Ward 
contend: “evolutionary approaches in criminology” should “complement and enrich 
non-evolutionary explanations rather than replace them.” 
  In this vein, utilizing three of the mainstream theoretical perspectives in 
criminology—strain, control, and learning/development—to demonstrate or reveal 
the complementary nature of evolutionary and non-evolutionary explanations to 
criminal and antisocial behavior is quite effective. And, I suspect that with the usual 
exception of those critics with the standard litany of criticisms against the application 
of evolutionary explanations, most readers will find Durrant and Ward’s discussions 
both convincing and valuable. Again, I would certainly count myself among those 
readers. As a dialectician, I particularly like the way the authors use evolutionary 
analysis to propose a reduction in the tension or a reconciliation between those 
explanations of criminal offending that rely on strain theories and those that rely on 
control theories.   
 
Applying Evolutionary Behavioural Science 
  Although I think Durrant and Ward have done an admirable job in succinctly 
(only 1555 words) making the case for applying evolutionary behavioural science to 
punishment, I think that there is more to it than “simply” gene-culture co-evolution 
of universal motivation and cultural selectivity, concepts that I also employ (Barak, 
2009; 2003b). At the same time, I am generally comfortable with ideas of “altruistic Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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punishment,” “moralistic punishment,” and “strong reciprocity.” I am also quite 
comfortable with the evolutionary ideas of “ultrasociality.” However, I am less 
comfortable with Elias’ popular conception of a “civilizing process” as I also believe 
this process had as much to do with Hobbes’ Leviathan and the state’s monopoly 
over the use of force. Moreover, what is missing from this evolutionary discussion of 
punishment is a dialectical appreciation for the interacting social relations of 
adversarialism and mutualism. The idea that humans are fundamentally ambivalent 
toward people or phenomena about which they have strong feelings helps to make 
sense of seemingly contradictory behavior directed at the same types of normative 
violations over time and across cultures.  
As Gordon Fellman (1998: 52) has observed, “a common meaning of 
opposition is the warding off of attraction to the other’s virtues, accomplishments, 
wickedness, élan, body. Often in relationships inside and outside of families, a 
stylized ‘picking on’ the other can be seen as both a form of intimacy and as 
disguised adversarialism suggesting unfaced ambivalence.” The same can be said of 
impersonal bullying involving adolescents, tribes, or nation-states. Similarly, in the 
dialectical compromise between conflicting desires to merge with others and to 
separate from them, there are forces simultaneously pushing toward and away from 
punishment. As I have written about violence and nonviolence: “Unconsciously, 
ambivalence may underlie mutualism as well as adversarialism; each may be 
premised on combating others. If psychoanalysis is correct that we are all inevitably 
ambivalent toward parents, others, self, and even life itself, then people can face 
and enact both positive and negatives valences, favor positive or negative valences, 
or act on some positive and some negative valences” (Barak, 2003b: 281).  
Or, in terms of Donald Black’s The Behavior of the Law (1976); his 
comprehensive explanatory theory of law in action links law or governmental social 
control (punishment) to stratification, differentiation, social distance, location in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Commentary  
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center/periphery of social life, symbolic culture, organization, and non-legal social 
control. Moreover, Black’s epistemology of pure sociology dispenses not only with 
human psychology and the focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, but also 
with normative aspirations of jurisprudence. As he argues, equality before the law 
does not exist. “The reality is legal relativity, not legal universalism: Law varies with 
its social geometry—its location and direction in social space” (Black, 1976/2010: 
180). Such a theory, Black acknowledges in a recent interview, “completely flies in 
the face of the conceptions of law and justice found among lawyers, judges, legal 
scholars and members of the general public” (Ibid.). And, among those conceptions 
favored by most criminologists as well.  
  Like law, punishment also varies with its social geometry and does not 
conform to the ideals or ideologies of conventional jurisprudence. For example, in my 
most recent integrated endeavors involving Wall Street looting and federal regulatory 
colluding, I have developed two integrated models, one on “organizational fraud” and 
the other on “institutional fraud.” At their respective levels of analysis, each of these 
models integrates the behaviors and interests of the offenders and the behaviors and 
interests of the regulators with the behaviors and interests of financial capitalism. I 
have then taken these vertical integrations and blended them with Black’s theory of 
the law to explain, among other things, why Wall Street banks and other financial 
firms were able to get away with their systemic violations of securities laws without a 
single offender ever being legally prosecuted for these crimes, let alone, criminally 
sanctioned or punished for them (Barak, 2012). 
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